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Abstract
We examine conditions under which an exclusive license granted by
the upstream producer of a component that some consumers regard
as essential to one of two potential suppliers of a downstream plat-
form market can make the unlicensed supplier unprotable, although
both rms would be protable if both were licensed. If downstream
varieties are close substitutes, an exclusive license need not be exclu-
sionary. If downstream varieties are highly di¤erentiated, an exclusive
license is exclusionary, but it is not in the interest of the upstream rm
to grant an exclusive license. For intermediate levels of product dif-
ferentiation, an exclusive license is exclusionary and maximizes the
upstream rms payo¤.
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1 Introduction
We model a platform market that is supplied by an upstream rm with a
complementary good that some consumers on one side of the market regard
as essential. The model is a stylized version of a newspaper market, poten-
tially a duopoly. Downstream rms are di¤erentiated platforms, newspapers,
that supply the two sides, advertisers and readers, of the platform market.
The upstream rm, a syndicate, is the monopoly supplier of publishable ma-
terial  newspaper columns and comic strips. We show that the impact
of an exclusive license granted by the upstream rm to one of the down-
stream rms depends on the extent of di¤erentiation between the products
of the downstream rms and on the relative size of the market segment that
regards the complementary good as essential. If consumers regard down-
stream varieties as close substitutes, duopoly with only one rm licensed to
publish the complementary material can be an equilibrium outcome. For
intermediate degrees of product di¤erentiation and a su¢ ciently large frac-
tion of the population that regards the complementary good as essential, an
exclusive license can deprive the unlicensed rm of enough advertising rev-
enue to make it unprotable. For high levels of product di¤erentiation, an
exclusive license would make an unlicensed newspaper unprotable, but the
payo¤-maximizing choice for the upstream rm is to license both rms.
In a platform market, two groups of users interact through a platform
rm. The benet to users on one side of the market increases with the
number of users on the other side of the market, and a platform is able
to charge individual prices to the two groups (Rochet and Tirole, 2006).
The newspaper industry is a prototypical example of a platform market. It
involves three sets of players: newspapers, readers, and advertisers. In this
perspective, readers and advertisers are the two user groups that interact on
newspaper platforms.
A newspaper commonly publishes features (articles, comics, puzzles, etc.),
along with local, national, and international news and advertisements. News-
paper employees prepare some published material; the remainder is pur-
chased from press syndicates. Press syndicates are upstream rms that sell
specialized material to newspapers. Some such syndicates specialize in the
distribution of comic strips, acting as agents for cartoonists, often under
exclusive contracts.
An episode from the Dallas, Texas newspaper market exemplies the phe-
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nomenon we model.1 On August 2, 1989, the Dallas Morning News (Morning
News) signed an exclusive contract for 26 columns and comic strips provided
by the Universal Press Syndicate. Until the signing of the exclusive contract,
the material had been available through the Dallas Times Herald (Times
Herald). The two newspapers had competed in the Dallas area for more
than a century. The Universal Syndicate acknowledged that the move was
predatory, but said that denial of the material was required by its contract
with the Morning News. The Times Herald su¤ered a circulation loss of 9,000
to 10,000 weekday and 15,000 Sunday deliveries. It led an antitrust lawsuit
asking for $33 million in actual damages and up to three times that amount
in punitive damages against the Morning News and its parent company.
A state judge in Texas refused to grant the Times Herald a preliminary
injunction to prevent the movement of the syndicated features, on the ground
that the Times Herald could publish substitute features supplied by compet-
ing syndicates. The Times Herald subsequently lost a District Court jury
trial and an appeal of the District Court outcome. The Morning News
nonetheless paid $1.5 million to the Times Herald as part of an outside set-
tlement. The Times Herald was unable to recapture its lost reader base and
advertising revenue. The Morning Newsparent corporation purchased the
Times Herald on December 8, 1991 and stopped its publication the next day.2
Although we focus specically on the newspaper market in the current
study, other platform markets can also portray similar situations of exclusiv-
ity. An example of such from the U.S. television industry involves Project
Runway, a reality show based on fashion design that was shown by the Bravo
Network from 2004 to 2008. On July 2006 the shows producers made an
exclusive deal to move the show to Lifetime Television starting from 2009.
Litigation followed, and was privately settled after Bravo Network prevailed
1See the Appeals Court decision in Times Herald Printing Co. v. A. H. Belo Cor-
poration et al. (Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District) 820 S.W.2d 206; 1991
Tex. App. LEXIS 2899; 335-66 Trade Cas. (CCH) P69, 680 (1991). Also see Gelsanliter
(1995).
2The rise of the internet has made print media a declining industry. (The general
increase in concentration in the newspaper markets of US cities, and the corresponding
reasons and consequences are discussed in Bucklin et al. (1989) and Genesove (2003).)
Our stylized model is not meant to imply that the Morning Newsexclusive arrangement
with the United Press Syndicate was the unique factor responsible for the demise of the
Times Herald. But the fact that the Times Heralds otherwise unsuccessful legal action
resulted in a $1.5 million private settlement is consistent with the view that the exclusive
arrangement was a contributing factor in the demise.
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in early stages. In 2009, Bravo Network launched a competing program (The
Fashion Show), which enjoyed about one-quarter Project Runways number
of viewers, and correspondingly less advertising revenue. The Fashion Show
broadcast its last episode on 25 January 2011.3
The results of the current study contribute to two literatures. First, it
broadens our understanding of the nature of strategic interactions in imper-
fectly competitive platform markets. Second, it contributes to the literature
on exclusion by considering the e¤ect of an exclusive license for a comple-
mentary good in a platform market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the
parts of the literature on exclusionary contracts involving complementary
goods that are most closely related to the present study. Section 3 contains
the setup of the model. In Section 4, we present results for the monopoly
case. Section 5 contains the basic duopoly model. Section 6 discusses equi-
librium licensing behavior for moderately di¤erentiated newspapers. Section
7 contrasts the outcome for an intermediate degree of product di¤erentiation
with outcomes if product di¤erentiation is either low or high. Section 8
concludes.4
2 Literature Review5
The issue of exclusion and complementary components is discussed in the
empirical literature. Dewenter (2003) shows that newspapers, among other
media, can form consumer habits that translate into demand for a commodity
that becomes an essential component of the media product. Argentesi (2004)
shows empirically that weekly supplements (comics, puzzles, etc.) increase
3See Hu¤, Richard Project Runwayquits Bravo for Lifetime,NYDailyNews.com 7
April 2008; Lafayette, Jon NBCU wins round in Project Runway,TVWeek.com, 26
September 2008; Associated Press, Project Runwayis cleared for move to Lifetime from
Bravo,1 April 2009. For a further example of an exclusionary strategy based on loss of
advertising revenue in a platform market, see Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143 (1951). Similarly, T-Mobiles failure to obtain the right to sell Apple iPhones was
mentioned as a factor in its proposed March 2011 takeover by AT&T. Other examples are
provided by killer appsavailable only on a single platform; see Viecens (2009).
4Full details of proofs are contained in an appendix that is available on request from
the authors.
5See Rysman (2009) and Whinston (2006, Chapter 4) for surveys of platform markets
and exclusionary vertical contracts, respectively.
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readership of (and as a result advertisement in) newspapers. If a newspaper
is denied the possibility of supplying habit-forming content, the newspaper
will see its reader base, and with it advertising revenue, decline. This loss
of revenue from one side of the market because of reduced patronage on the
other side is central to the exclusionary impact of an exclusive license in a
platform market.6
In the theoretical literature, the issue of exclusion manifests itself in dif-
ferent ways when modeling di¤erent industries. Church and Gandal (2005)
argue that directly denying or restricting compatibility among complemen-
tary products is exclusionary in the telecommunications industry.7 Hagiu
and Lee (2011) discuss the incentives of content providers to enter into ex-
clusive as opposed to non-exclusive contracts with platforms (such as TV
channels).8 Their model has much in common with ours: downstream rms
are platforms; end users (readers, in our model) single home. But there is
no essential complementary good in Hagiu and Lee (2011), and the nature
of their results hinges on whether or not the content provider controls its
own pricing to end users. Direct control of pricing does not arise in newspa-
per markets, which we use as our prototype. In our model, it is the degree
of product di¤erentiation in the downstream market that determines if the
upstream rm o¤ers an exclusive license for its content.
Hogendorn and Yuen (2009) develop a model that can be thought of as
a stylized version of a video game console duopoly. User utility from a
platform rises with the number of components on the platform. Compo-
nents developed for one platform can be ported to the other, at a cost. A
content provider o¤ers a must-have component that provides additional
utility. Each console has an installed base of locked-in users. Whereas
Hogendorn and Yuen limit attention to parameter values for which exclu-
sion of one platform (tipping) does not occur, we explore conditions under
which an exclusive license for an essential complementary good results in
exclusion. The components of the Hogendorn and Yuen model correspond
to advertisements in the Armstrong (2006) model that we extend. There is
no equivalent of porting in this framework since readers are not locked-in in
6We incorporate this e¤ect in our model by assuming that a fraction  of the reader side
of the market will read a newspaper, if at all, only if it includes an essential complementary
good, as further discussed in Section 3.2.
7See also the remarks of Rey and Tirole (2007, p. 2205).
8See also Stennek (2014), Weeds (2015).
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the Hotelling framework.9
Doganoglu and Wright (2010) model agreements by agents on one side
of a platform to supply only one platform rm. Their basic model is of a
one-sided market. Our model examines conditions under which an upstream
rm will o¤er an exclusive license to one platform rm. The Doganoglu and
Wright model does not involve essential components, either in the sense of
Hogendorn and Yuen (2009) or in the sense of the model developed here.
3 Setup
We modify the Armstrong (2006) competitive bottlenecksmodel (Arm-
strong, 2006, p. 679): Here, if it wishes to interact with an agent on the
single-homing side, the multi-homing side has no choice but to deal with that
agents chosen platform. Thus, platforms have monopoly power over provid-
ing access to their single-homing customers for the multi-homing side.The
two sides of the platform market are comprised of readers and advertisers,
respectively.
We assume that readers single-home, reading at most one newspaper.10
Di¤erences in reader taste and preference are captured by one of the standard
models of horizontal product di¤erentiation, the Hotelling main street model.
If both rms enter, there are two newspapers, Alocated at the left end and
B located at the right end of a Hotelling line of length 1. Newspapers
sell advertising space to advertisers and print copies of newspapers for sale
to readers. There is a syndicate that sells copyrighted materials, such as
cartoons and comics, to the newspapers. We normalize the mass of potential
9Lee (2013) analyzes the impact of vertical integration and exclusivity on the sixth
generation of the U.S. video game industry. He nds that exclusive contracts facilitated
entry, but notes that this is not a necessary outcome (p. 2962): although certain exclusive
titles on the incumbent platform sold more copies than any title on the entrant platforms,
estimates indicate that these titles did not inuence hardware demand as much as those
onboard the entrants. If it were the case that the most valuable software products were
exclusive to the incumbent in the data, then the predictions of the counterfactual would
have been reversed. Shapiro (1999, p. 676) ascribes exclusionary e¤ects to exclusive
contracts entered into by the Nintendo Entertainment System.
10Rysman (2007) documents that credit-card users concentrate purchases on one credit
card, in e¤ect single-homing, while holding infrequently-used credit cards in reserve. In
the same way, one may take the assumption of single-homing newspaper readers as ap-
proximating the conduct of users who read primarily one newspaper, while occasionally
looking at other newspapers.
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readers and the mass of potential advertisers to be 1. Readers are uniformly
distributed along the Hotelling line and incur transportation cost t per
unit distance to the chosen end of the line in reading a newspaper.11 niR
denotes the number of readers of newspaper i, and nia denotes the number of
rms that advertise in newspaper i.12
I
Syndicate:
o¤er one
or two
licenses
................................................................... II
Platforms:
accept or reject
license, if o¤ered;
enter or stay out;
set prices
................................................................. III
Advertisers:
place ads.
Readers: select
newspaper,
if any
Figure 1: Sequence of decisions.
We model the incentive of the syndicate to o¤er an exclusive license and
the incentive of a newspaper to accept a license, exclusive or not, if o¤ered.
We investigate Nash equilibrium outcomes.
The three stages of the game are shown in Figure 1. We treat the syndi-
cates costs as being entirely sunk before it interacts with newspapers.13 In
stage I, the syndicate makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a license to publish
the complementary material to either one (without loss of generality, to rm
A) or both newspapers.14 In stage II, if a newspaper is o¤ered a license, it
decides among three options: (i) accept the license and enter the market, (ii)
reject the license and enter the market, or (iii) stay out of the market. If a
newspaper is not o¤ered a license, it decides either to enter the market or
11In the context of newspaper markets, preferences might relate to the ideological posi-
tion of a newspapers editorial page. Alternatively, preferences might represent the time
of day at which a reader would prefer to receive a newspaper; in practice, the alternatives
are morning and evening.
12In what follows, unless otherwise noted, references to newspaper ishould be under-
stood to carry the qualication for i = A, B.
13It would be possible to model the syndicates arrangements with the authors of the
material it markets; this would take us far aeld from our topic.
14In principle, one might include a third option, not to o¤er a license to either newspaper.
The syndicates payo¤ for this option is zero economic prot, it would not be a prot-
maximizing choice, and we eliminate it for simplicity.
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to stay out.15 Newspapers that enter set advertising rates and newspaper
prices. In the nal stage, advertisers place advertisements and readers select
newspapers.
The terms on which the syndicate o¤ers a license determine the division
of economic prot between the syndicate and a platform that accepts the
o¤er of a license. Market outcomes under alternative licensing arrangements
determine the magnitude of the rents that are divided between syndicate and
platforms.
3.1 Advertisers
Let i denote newspaper is per-reader advertising rate.16 The cost of placing
an advertisement in newspaper i is
iniR:
Advertisers di¤er in their prot per sale, . Following Armstrong (2006),
we assume that newspapers do not observe the  of any particular advertiser,
but know the distribution of  in the population of advertisers. We assume
 is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. Given this distribution, it
will be protable for an advertiser to place an advertisement in newspaper i
if the prot from placing the advertisement is greater than or equal to the
cost of placing the advertisement, niR  iniR. The expected number of
advertisements demanded from newspaper i is therefore
nia = 1  i: (1)
3.2 Readers
3.2.1 No Essential Component
If there is no essential complementary good, the net utility of a reader of
newspaper i, before allowing for transportation cost t is
uiR = n
i
a   pi;
15Staying out of the marketmeans the newspaper can earn a normal rate of return
on investment elsewhere.
16See Rosse (1970) for an estimation of advertising cost in newspaper and Armstrong
(2006) for discussion of the case in which the price of placing an advertisement is not
proportional to the number of readers.
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where  is marginal utility per advertisement.17
As noted above, we assume readers single-home. For a reader located at
x on the Hotelling line, net utilities are
uAR   tx
from newspaper A,
uBR   t (1  x) ;
from newspaper B.
If the market is covered,18 boundary readers are at a location that yields
the same net utility from either newspaper, leading to boundary location
nAR = x
 =
1
2
+
uAR   uBR
2t
=
1
2
+
nAa   pA  
 
nBa   pB

2t
: (2)
The number of readers of each newspaper are
nAR =
1
2
+

 
nAa   nBa
  pA + pB
2t
(3)
nBR =
1
2
+

 
nBa   nAa
  pB + pA
2t
: (4)
3.2.2 Essential Complementary Good
If some portion  of the population regards comics as an essential com-
plementary good, we assume that the specication of readers demand in
equations (3) and (4) describes the preferences of the fraction 1    of the
population, for 0    1, that does not regard comics as essential. Then
quantities demanded of each newspaper from this part of the population are
17We follow Armstrong (2006) and model advertisements as information-containing mes-
sages that are valued by consumers. This specication makes explicit the reason businesses
nd it protable to advertise: by informing readers of a purchase opportunity, advertisers
increase sales. An alternative specication would treat advertisements as bads rather
than goods; see Kind et al. (2006) for a model of the television market along these lines.
In this formulation, even though advertisements reduce readersutility, they are protable
for rms.
18Equation (18), Section 5.1, gives the maximum value of t for the market to be covered
in low-t duopoly if both newspapers are licensed to publish the essential complementary
material.
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1    times the numbers of readers given by (3) and (4), from platforms A
and B respectively.
We assume that the remaining portion  of the population will read only
a newspaper that publishes comics. Otherwise, the utility of this group
of consumers is as above. That is, for a consumer who regards comics as
an essential component of a newspaper, comics yield no utility in and of
themselves, but are a prerequisite for getting utility from a newspaper. This
specication minimizes the exclusionary e¤ect of an exclusive license to print
comics.19 A consumer who regards comics as an essential component of
a newspaper purchases a newspaper only if it contains comics and if the
net utility from reading the newspaper, allowing for transportation cost, is
nonnegative.
Suppose newspaper A has an exclusive license to publish comics. The
most-distant reader from the comicsgroup who reads newspaper A is at
the right end of the line if (recall the length of the line is 1) uAR   t =
nAa   pA   t  0; or equivalently if pA is su¢ ciently low,
pA  nAa   t:
On the other hand, if
pA > nAa   t;
the most distant reader from the comicsgroup who reads newspaper A is
at the distance that makes net utility zero, x =
 
nAa   pA

=t.
Quantities demanded of the two newspapers are
nAR = (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
nAa   nBa
  pA + pB
2t
#
+

1 pA  nAa   t
nAa  pA
t
pA > nAa   t
(5)
nBR = (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
nBa   nAa
  pB + pA
2t
#
: (6)
The number of readers for a newspaper with an exclusive license di¤ers
depending on whether price is low (all consumers who regard comics as es-
sential read the licensed newspaper) or high (consumers who regard comics
as essential and who are distant from the licensed newspaper do not read any
newspaper).
19See the discussion in Section 2 of Hogendorn and Yuen (2009).
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3.3 Platforms
The cost of producing one issue of a newspaper that contains na advertise-
ments is
f + cna:
f is the part of the cost of printing a newspaper that is xed with respect
to the number of advertisements. c is the constant marginal cost per adver-
tisement per issue. cna is marginal cost. The newspapers overall xed cost
is F .20
Let
iR = p
i +
 
i   c  1  i  f (7)
denote newspaper is prot per reader  revenue pi on the sale of the news-
paper to the reader, i   c gross prot per reader per advertisement placed,
nia = 1  i advertisements placed, minus f .
Newspaper is prot maximization problem is
max
pi;i
niR
i
R   F: (8)
4 A Monopoly Platform
We examine monopoly equilibrium both to build intuition and because if
an exclusive license makes it unprotable for one newspaper to operate, it
is monopoly prot that is divided between the licensed newspaper and the
syndicate.
Suppose there is only one platform, newspaper A. If newspaper A is a
monopoly supplier, the net utility of a reader located at x is
uAR = 
 
1  A  pA   tx:
If the monopoly newspaper has a license for the essential complementary
good, its number of readers is
nAR =
(
1 pA    1  A  t
(1 A) pA
t
pA    1  A  t : (9)
20The xed cost of gathering news to produce the rst copy of the paper is typically
high, the variable cost to print and sell additional copies of newspaper low. See Rosse
(1970) and Strömberg (2004) for estimation and interpretation of cost structures in the
newspaper market.
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If the monopoly newspaper does not have a license for the essential com-
plementary good, the expressions for the number of readers in (9) are scaled
down by a factor 1  .
4.1 Low price (low t)
In the low-price case, the market is covered. Newspaper As problem is
max
pA;A
nAR
A
R   F
such that
pA    1  A  t
(which gives nAR = 1).
Intuitively (and this can be veried formally), for newspaper A to maxi-
mize prot in the low-price case, the constraint must be binding for the most
distant reader,
pA = 
 
1  A  t  pmlow t: (10)
It cannot be optimal for newspaper A to leave the most distant consumer
with any surplus.
Given (10), newspaper As problem can be reformulated as
max
A
 
1  A  + A   c  t  f   F: (11)
The rst-order condition to solve (11) is 
1  A   + A   c  0: (12)
A marginal increase in A reduces the number of advertisements sold,
1 A, but increases prot per advertisement, +A c. Part of the change
in prot per advertisement is the decrease in the price readers pay, (10). Part
of the increase in prot per advertisement is the increase in prot from sales
to advertisers, A   c.
From (12), the monopoly price per reader of an advertisement is
A =
1
2
[1  (  c)]  :
Because  is the equilibrium price per reader per advertisement, the rst-
order condition that determines , and the resulting equilibrium value, is
12
 (1  )
pA
 (1  ) = pA + t
t
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Figure 2: Monopoly pricing, low-t regime. Shaded area is consumer surplus.
The horizontal axis shows location on the Hotelling line. The vertical axis
shows delivered price.
the same, , for all newspapers in all models considered in this paper. This
is the competitive bottleneck aspect of the basic model: depending on
the details (monopoly, duopoly, essential complementary good), a platforms
equilibrium number of readers will vary. But it is a monopolist with respect
to those readers access to advertisements, and it charges advertisers the
monopoly price.
The low-t monopoly outcome is illustrated in Figure 2.
4.2 High price (high t)
In the high-price regime, newspaper As problem is
max
pA;A
nAR
A
R   F
such that pA    1  A  t. The monopoly price per reader of an adver-
tisement is again , and the monopoly price is
pmhigh t =
1
2
[(+ c  ) (1  ) + f ] : (13)
A consistency condition for this solution to be valid is pmhigh t  
 
1  A 
t. On some rearrangement of terms, the consistency condition for the high-
13
t  tH t > tH
Licensed 2tH   t  F t
2
H
t
  F
Unlicensed (1  ) (2tH   t)  F (1  ) t
2
H
t
  F
Table 1: Monopoly payo¤s.
price solution to apply is that transportation cost be su¢ ciently high,
t >
1
2

(1  )2   f : (14)
In the contrary case,
t  1
2

(1  )2   f ; (15)
it is the low-price solution that maximizes monopoly prot.
The threshold value of transportation cost, which should be given its g-
urative interpretation as an indicator of the extent of product di¤erentiation,
appears repeatedly in what follows, and for notational compactness we dene
tH  1
2

(1  )2   f : (16)
4.3 Monopoly Payo¤s
For low levels of transportation cost, t  tH , a monopoly supplier sets price
so the market is covered, extracting all surplus from the most distant readers.
For higher levels of transportation cost, the market is not covered. Row 1 of
Table 1 gives the equilibrium payo¤ of a monopoly newspaper if the news-
paper is licensed (all readers are in the market, although not all readers may
be served). Row 2 of Table 1 gives the equilibrium payo¤s of an unlicensed
monopolist.
In what follows, we assume parameter values such that licensed monopoly
is protable. From the second row, an unlicensed monopoly is unprotable
for  su¢ ciently close to 1.
5 Newspaper Duopoly
Expression (8) is the generic form of the duopoly maximization problem.
The relation between the number of readers and prices di¤ers depending on
14
whether both newspapers are licensed, one newspaper is licensed, or neither
newspaper is licensed.
5.1 Both newspapers licensed
As noted above (see remarks immediately after (12)), the equilibrium price
per reader of an advertisement is  = 1
2
[1  (  c)]. If both newspapers
are licensed and the market is covered, equilibrium prices to readers are
pA = pB = t  [(1  ) (   c)  f ] : (17)
The market is covered at these prices, as we assume, for
t  4
3
tH : (18)
It would be possible to analyze scenarios in which the center of the market
is not served in duopoly equilibrium. But such cases would not involve ex-
clusion, and we conne our attention to cases in which the market is covered
in duopoly.21
The corresponding payo¤ per newspaper is
dLL =
1
2
t  F:
We assume F  1
2
t, which ensures that equilibrium duopoly prot per
newspaper in the low-t case if both newspapers are licensed is nonnegative.22
Duopoly equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3.
5.2 Neither newspaper licensed
If neither newspaper is licensed, demands are scaled down by the factor 1 .
The resulting payo¤ per newspaper is
dUL;UL =
1
2
(1  ) t  F: (19)
From (7), the reduction in prot of an unlicensed newspaper includes lost
advertising revenue, a kind of loss unique to a newspaper that supplies a
platform market.
21If one newspaper has an exclusive license to publish the complementary good, the
assumption is that the submarket of readers who are indi¤erent to the complement is
covered.
22This in turn implies that a licensed monopolist is protable in the low-t case.
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Figure 3: Duopoly equilibrium (no exclusive component or both newspapers
licensed), market covered. Shaded area is consumer surplus. The horizontal
axis shows location on the Hotelling line. The vertical axis shows delivered
price.
5.3 Duopoly: one newspaper licensed, one newspaper
unlicensed
Without loss of generality, suppose that newspaper A has a license for the
essential complementary good, newspaper B does not.
5.3.1 Low price (low t)
Objective functions are given by (8), and the numbers of readers are
nAR = + (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
B   A  pA + pB
2t
#
(20)
and
nBR =
1
2
(1  )
"
1 +

 
A   B  pB + pA
t
#
: (21)
Economic prot per reader is given by (7). Equilibrium price per reader
per advertisement is the bottleneck value for both newspapers, A = B = .
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Equilibrium prices are23
pA =
4
3

1  t+ t  [(1  
) (   c)  f ] (22)
pB =
2
3

1  t+ t  [(1  
) (   c)  f ] : (23)
The consistency condition for the low-price solution to be valid is pA 
nAa   t, and this is satised for
t  1  
1  1
3

tH  tL: (24)
5.3.2 High price (high t)
In the high-price regime, newspaper A serves only a portion fraction of read-
ers who regard the complementary good as essential. It divides the other
group of consumers with newspaper B.
Newspaper Bs rst-order conditions are unchanged from the low-pA regime.
Newspaper As prot per reader is also as in the low-pA regime. Newspaper
As number of readers in the high-pA case is
nAR = 

 
1  A  pA
t
+ (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
B   A  pA + pB
2t
#
: (25)
Equilibrium readersprices are
pA =
4 [ (1  )  t] + (3 + ) ft  [(1  ) (   c)  f ]g
3 + 5
: (26)
pB =
2 [ (1  )  t] + 3 (1 + ) ft  [(1  ) (   c)  f ]g
3 + 5
: (27)
5.4 Consistency
The consistency condition for the equilibrium price given by (26) to be in
the high-pA case is
pA   (1  )  t:
23Nothing is gained by combining the terms in t on the right in (22) and (23).
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t
tH
tL
High pA
Low pA
pA =  (1  )  t
0 1
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Figure 4: Pricing regimes, (; t)-space, duopoly, newspaper A licensed, news-
paper B not licensed.
After some manipulation, this becomes
t  tH : (28)
The consistency condition for the low-pA regime, (24), is t  tL. In com-
bination, we have three ranges relating t to newspaper As prot-maximizing
price to readers,
t  tL pA   (1  )  t
tL  t  tH pA =  (1  )  t
tH  t pA   (1  )  t
: (29)
6 Intermediate product di¤erentiation: tL 
t  tH
For an intermediate degree of product di¤erentiation, tL  t  tH , newspaper
A sets pA to extract all surplus from the most distant readers who regard
the complementary material as essential. The magnitude of tH  tL increases
with  (see Figure 4).
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Figure 5: Duopoly, newspaper A licensed, newspaper B not licensed,
intermediate-t case. The horizontal axis shows location on the Hotelling
line. The vertical axis shows delivered price.
The essential-complementary good submarket is covered. This case is
shown in Figure 5. The elements of the intermediate-t equilibrium are sum-
marized here:
A = B = :
nAa = n
B
a = 1  :
nAR = 1 
1
2
(1  )  (1  
)  pB
t
:
nBR =
1
2
(1  )  (1  
)  pB
t
:
In this case, nAR + n
B
R = 1 and all readers are served. Further, n
A
R ! 1
and nBR ! 0 as ! 1.
Knowing pA, we obtain pB from newspaper Bs reader-price rst-order
condition. Newspapersequilibrium prots are
AL;UL =
2t
1 + 

1  1
2
(1  ) tH
t
2
  F (30)
BL;UL =
1
2
(1  ) t
2
H
t
  F: (31)
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6.1 License o¤er games
For the syndicate, the license o¤er game is an optimal control problem: it
decides which of two games the newspapers play. The syndicate may make
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a license only to newspaper A (without loss of
generality) at a contingent fee (L1A; L
2
A), where L
1
A is the fee if newspaper B
does not enter and L2A is the fee if newspaper B does enter. Alternatively,
the syndicate may make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to both newspapers at con-
tingent fee (L1AB; L
2
AB; L
3
AB), where L
1
AB is the fee paid by one newspaper
if the other newspaper does not enter, L2AB is the license fee paid by one
newspaper if the other newspaper accepts the o¤er and enters, and L3AB is
the license fee if the other newspaper rejects the o¤er and enters. In all
cases, equilibrium license fees leaves each newspaper a small positive payo¤
if the o¤er is accepted.24
If the syndicate o¤ers a license only to newspaper A, A and B play the
game shown in Figure 6. Newspaper A may either accept the o¤er of an
exclusive license and enter the market, reject the o¤er and enter the market,
or stay out. The game then moves to one of newspaper Bs decision nodes.
At each node, Bs choices are to enter the market without a license or to stay
out of the market.
If the syndicate o¤ers a license to both newspapers, A and B play the
game shown in Figure 8. Newspapers simultaneously decide to accept the
o¤er of a license and enter the market, to reject the o¤er and enter the
market, or to stay out.
6.1.1 Syndicate o¤ers a license only to newspaper A
It is reasonable to assume that if the Syndicate o¤ers a license to newspaper
A, newspaper B would be aware of the o¤er and As response when it makes
its entry decision. Thus the path of decisions (Figure 6) is sequential.
24In equilibrium, it is L1A that is paid in the rst game, L
2
AB that is paid in the second
game. The other license fees maximize the syndicates payo¤ o¤ the equilibrium path.
If the syndicate species license fee L1A for all states of the world in the rst game, and
license fee L2AB for all states of the world in the second game, Nash equilibrium outcomes
are as indicated in the text.
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A1....................................................................................
B1
Accept,
Enter
...........................................
Enter
T1
A L
B UL
..........................................
Stay
out
T2
A L
..............
B2
Reject,
Enter
...........................................
Enter
..........................................
Stay
out
T3
A UL
B UL
T4
A UL
...................................................................................
B3
Stay out
...........................................
Enter
..........................................
Stay
out
T5
B UL
T6
No
NP
Figure 6: Outcomes of A, B game if syndicate o¤ers an exclusive license to
A. Ldenotes licensed, ULdenotes unlicensed.
License fees If newspaper A accepts an o¤er of an exclusive license, Bs
payo¤ as an unlicensed duopolist, BL;UL, is negative for  su¢ ciently large:
 > 1  2tF
t2H
 X : (32)
For such , if newspaper A accepts an o¤er of an exclusive license, it
generates economic prot
mL = 2tH   t  F:
If the syndicate makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an exclusive license to
A, to ensure that A will accept, it will set a license fee that in equilibrium
leaves newspaper A a small positive economic prot if it accepts the license
and newspaper B does not enter:
L1A = 
m
L   "; (33)
for " positive and small.
If newspaper B enters without a license, newspaper As payo¤ is (30).
The contingent license fee that maximizes the syndicates payo¤ in this out-
of-equilibrium state of the world is
L2A = 
A
L;UL   ": (34)
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If A accepts the o¤er and B stays out, A makes a small positive economic
prot, B makes zero economic prot. If A accepts the o¤er and B enters,
B makes losses for  su¢ ciently large. If A rejects the o¤er and both
newspapers enter in the market, the two newspapers are a duopoly serving a
market of 1    readers. Duopoly prots per newspaper, (19), are negative
for
 > 1  2F
t
 UL;UL: (35)
We have assumed  > X , and this implies  > UL;UL. Hence if A
rejects the license o¤er and both newspapers enter, both newspapers make
economic losses.
If A rejects the o¤er of an exclusive license and enters, while B stays out,
As economic prot as an unlicensed monopolist (see Table 1) is negative for
 > 1  F
2tH   t  
m
UL: (36)
Assume
 > max (X ; 
m
UL) :
Under this assumption, if A rejects the o¤er of an exclusive license and
enters, while B stays out, then A makes economic losses and B makes zero
economic prot.
If A stays out, and B enters, A earns zero economic prot. B is an
unlicensed monopolist. The assumption  > max (X ; 
m
UL) implies that B
makes economic losses.
If the syndicate o¤ers a license only to newspaper A, the newspapers
play the game shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows the payo¤ matrix for the
resulting nite game of complete and perfect information. The signs shown
in the gure are valid for  > max (X ; 
m
UL).
(Accept and enter, Stay out) is the unique noncooperative equilibrium of
the game. The syndicates payo¤ is
L1A = 
m
L   " = 2tH   t  F   ";
for " small.
6.1.2 Syndicate o¤ers licenses to A and B
License fee If the syndicate makes simultaneous o¤ers of licenses to both
newspapers, newspaper decisions are simultaneous, and newspapers play the
22
AB
Accept,
Enter
Reject,
Enter
Stay out
Enter Stay out
 > 0
BL;UL < 0
AUL;UL < 0
BUL;UL < 0
0
mUL < 0
 > 0
0
mUL < 0
0
0
0
Figure 7: Payo¤ matrix for newspaper game if syndicate o¤ers an exclusive
license to newspaper A. Upper element is As payo¤, lower element is Bs
payo¤. Signs given are for  su¢ ciently large; see text for discussion.
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..........................................
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A UL
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............................................
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T14
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......
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Figure 8: Outcomes of A, B game if syndicate o¤ers licenses to both news-
papers. Ldenotes licensed, ULdenotes unlicensed.
game shown Figure 8. With contingent license fees
L1AB = 
m
L   " (37)
L2AB = 
d
LL   " (38)
L3AB = 
d
L;UL   "; (39)
a newspaper that accepts the o¤er earns payo¤ " > 0 whatever the decision
of the other newspaper, makes losses if it rejects and enters, for  su¢ ciently
large, and breaks even if it stays out.
Figure 9 shows the payo¤ matrix for the game played by A and B if the
syndicate o¤ers licenses to both newspapers. The signs shown in the gure
are valid for  > max (X ; 
m
UL). The unique noncooperative equilibrium of
the game is (Accept and enter, Accept and enter). The syndicates payo¤ is
2LAB = 
A
L;L   "+ BL;L   " = 2

1
2
t  F   "

:
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AB
Accept,
Enter
Reject,
Enter
Reject,
Stay out
Accept
Enter
Reject,
Enter
Stay out
" > 0
" > 0
" > 0
BL;UL < 0
" > 0
0
AUL;L < 0
" > 0
AUL;UL < 0
BUL;UL < 0
mUL < 0
0
0
" > 0
0
mUL < 0
0
0
Figure 9: Payo¤ matrix for newspaper game if syndicate o¤ers a license to
both newspapers. Upper element is As payo¤, lower element is Bs payo¤.
Signs given are for  su¢ ciently large; see text for discussion.
6.1.3 Syndicates payo¤
The di¤erence between the syndicates payo¤ if it o¤ers an exclusive license
and if it o¤ers both newspapers licenses is
LA   2LAB = mL  
 
AL;L + 
B
L;L

+ "
= 2 (tH   t) + " > 0:
This implies
Theorem 1 For intermediate values of t (tL  t  tH) and  su¢ ciently
large,
(a) the syndicates payo¤-maximizing choice is to make a take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er of an exclusive license to one of the two newspapers, at license fee LA =
mL   ";
(b) the payo¤-maximizing choice of the newspaper that is o¤ered a license is to
accept it;
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Licensed Monopoly Licensed Duopoly Duopoly   Monopoly
Newspaper
prot
2tH   t  F t  2F  2 (tH   t)  F < 0
Advertiser
prot
1
2
(1  )2 1
2
(1  )2 0
Consumer
Surplus
1
2
t 2 (tH   t) + 34t 2 (tH   t) + 14t > 0
Net Sur-
plus
2tH   12t  F + 12 (1  )2 2tH   14t  2F + 12 (1  )2 14t  F
Table 2: Welfare Comparison, Intermediate-t.
(c) the payo¤-maximizing choice of the newspaper that is not o¤ered a li-
cense is to stay out of the market.
For  su¢ ciently close to 1, the syndicate maximizes its payo¤by making
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an exclusive license to one of the two newspapers,
at license fee LA = mL   ". For intermediate degrees of product di¤erentia-
tion, an exclusive license for a complementary good that a su¢ cient number
of consumers regard as essential can make the unlicensed newspaper unprof-
itable, although both newspapers would be protable if both were licensed.
6.1.4 Welfare
Table 2 compares prots, consumer surplus, and net surplus under licensed
monopoly and licensed duopoly for the intermediate-t case.25 The newspa-
per prot given in the rst row of the table is the total prot generated
by the operation of active newspapers.26 Comparing licensed duopoly and
licensed monopoly shows that monopoly prot is greater than total duopoly
prot, and duopoly consumer surplus is greater than monopoly consumer
surplus. Advertisersprot is the same under both regimes, since the mar-
ket is covered in both cases. The di¤erence in net surplus under the two
25We do not enter into the debate over the Kaldor-Hicks hypothetical compensation
principle, which leads to use of net surplus as a welfare measure, and Lionel Robbinsview
that the components of net surplus should be examined separately, the terms of which are
well known (see Chipman and Moore, 1978).
26The license fee determines the division of this surplus between newspaper and syndi-
cate, but does not a¤ect the amount of the surplus.
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regimes is
NSd  NSm = 1
4
t  F: (40)
We have assumed that licensed duopoly is protable for both newspapers,
1
2
t F  0. Then NSd  NSm for F  1
4
t, NSd < NSm for 1
4
t < F  1
2
t. If
xed cost is small relative to reader preferences, duopoly net surplus exceeds
monopoly net surplus, and vice versa.
7 Low product di¤erentiation, high product
di¤erentiation27
In Section 6 we considered the case of intermediate product di¤erentiation,
tL  t  tH . Here we indicate briey results if di¤erentiation is low, t  tL,
or if di¤erentiation is high, t > tH .
7.1 Low product di¤erentiation
If newspapers are close substitutes, an example shows that an exclusive li-
cense need not be exclusionary.
The inequality that denes the low-t region is (24),
t  1  
1  1
3

tH = tL:
Let parameter values be  = 0:9001, c = f = 0:00001, F = 0:01, and
 = 0:8. Then tL = 0:1231. If t = 0:1, Bs payo¤ is 
B; low t
L;UL = 0:1244 > 0.
For any , if t is su¢ ciently small  if products are close enough to being
perfect substitutes, the unlicensed newspaper has positive prot.
With low di¤erentiation, Bs share of readers falls as  rises, but is
bounded away from 0. As As share of readers rises, it increases pA. As one
expects for price-setting duopoly, as A sets a higher price, so does B. The
net e¤ect of falling nBR and rising p
B as  rises is that Bs prot BL;UL rises
as  rises.
27Full details of the two cases considered in this section are given in the derivations
document mentioned in footnote 4.
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7.2 High product di¤erentiation
For
tH  t  4
3
tH ;
newspaper A sets a high-enough price that some of the essential-complementary
good submarket is uncovered, while the segment of the market that is indif-
ferent toward the complementary good is covered (see (18)).
From Table 1, licensed monopoly economic prot is
mhigh t =
t2H
t
  F;
and if the syndicate o¤ers an exclusive license, it will set license fee
Lhigh tA = 
m
high t   " (41)
for the equilibrium case that A accepts the o¤er of an exclusive license and
B stays out.
If the monopolist is unlicensed, its payo¤ m;ULhigh t = (1  ) t
2
H
t
  F is
negative for  su¢ ciently large,
 > 1  tF
t2H
= m;high tUL : (42)
Duopoly payo¤s if both newspapers are licensed or if neither newspaper
is licensed are unchanged from the previous cases. If the syndicate o¤ers
licenses to both newspapers, it will set contingent license fees to extract all
but a small amount of surplus at alternative terminal nodes of the game tree;
this is
Lhigh tAB =
1
2
t  F   "
for the case that both newspapers accept the o¤er. This leads to a game
with noncooperative equilibrium (Accept and enter, Accept and enter), for
 su¢ ciently large.
If the syndicate o¤ers A an exclusive license at appropriately structured
contingent license fees, the newspapers play a game with equilibrium (Accept
and enter, Stay out), for  su¢ ciently large. In this sense, an exclusive license
can be exclusionary.
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The di¤erence between the syndicates equilibrium payo¤ in the two cases
is
2Lhigh tAB   Lhigh tA =
t2   t2H
t
  F   ";
and this is of ambiguous sign. In the high-t licensed monopoly regime, the
market is uncovered. With licensed duopoly, the market is covered. For
small F and t tH su¢ ciently large, the syndicates payo¤harvesting duopoly
prot in a covered market can exceed its payo¤ from an uncovered monopoly
market.
An exclusive license can make the unlicensed newspaper unprotable.
But if product di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently great, a large-enough number of
readers would then be unserved that the syndicates most protable option
is to o¤er licenses to both newspapers.
8 Conclusion
The literature on one-sided markets (for example, Whinston (1990)) sug-
gests that tying, bundling, and exclusive dealing contracts may, but need
not, have exclusionary e¤ect. Our results extend this nding to exclusive
licenses in two-sided markets. In such markets, the exclusionary impact of
a loss of patronage from one side of the market (readers) is magnied by the
resulting loss in revenue (advertising) from the other side of the market, for
intermediate degrees of product di¤erentiation.
Many regional markets  regional in physical space, regional in product-
characteristic space  will support at most a small number of rms. In
such markets, an exclusive contract for a complementary product can make
unlicensed rms unprotable. Such exclusion makes consumers worse o¤,
and if consumer preferences are su¢ ciently strong, reduces net surplus.
Our results hold for the case of a monopoly upstream supplier of an
essential complementary good. A logical extension of this framework, and a
subject for possible future research, is to an upstream duopoly of vertically-
di¤erentiated components. It is natural to expect that exclusive licenses will
be exclusionary if upstream components di¤er sharply in quality, otherwise
not. One might also view press syndicates as platforms that allow advice
columnists, astrologers, and comic strip artists to interact with newspapers.
Also a subject for future research, this would lead to a model of an upstream
platform market supplying a downstream platform market.
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